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1 Introduction
Employers and firms may be held responsible for the loss caused to third
parties by their employees. The law of vicarious liability may also apply to
hold the corporation liable for torts committed by its directors. The aims
of inducing precaution may even support vicarious liability for government
bodies.1
Vicarious liability rests on the respondeat superior doctrine and means the
strict liability of a principal for the misconduct of her agent whose activities
she controls. Vicarious liability is in contrast to secondary liability imposed
on the principal under a negligence rule where the principal may be exempted
if she has selected and monitored her agent with sufficient care. Secondary
liability is not the subject of the present paper.
Vicarious liability increases the level of care of a wealth constrained agent
provided that the principal is able to monitor the agent’s precaution. Yet,
to do so, the principal may have to bear monitoring costs.
The principal may also be able to contractually alter her agent’s precau-
tion incentives. In fact, if the principal cannot directly monitor the agent’s
level of care she may offer a bonus to the agent whenever the accident has
been avoided. Yet, since the agent is wealth constrained, to generate precau-
tion incentives in this way, the principal may have to grant an information
rent in excess of her agent’s outside option. Similarly, in a setting of adverse
selection where an agent’s type remains hidden to the principal, she may also
have to leave an information rent to her agent.
The present paper provides an economic analysis of vicarious liability that
takes information rents and monitoring costs explicitly into account. It does
so under weak assumptions imposed on the classical accident model. The
probability of an accident is assumed to be decreasing whereas total costs as
perceived by the principal are assumed increasing with the agent’s precaution
level. No further assumptions will be needed to establish the main results of
the paper.
In the presence of information rents or if the principal’s wealth constraint
also matters, vicarious liability need not generate efficient (first best) pre-
1For an illuminating survey on vicarious and corporate civil liability, the reader is
referred to Kraakman (1999).
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caution incentives. Rather, precaution incentives will depend on the exact
specification of the quantum of damages awarded by courts. The problem
is of second best nature. I shall compare incentives under three damages
regimes: strict liability, the traditional negligence rule, and proportional lia-
bility.
To this end, I make use of what I shall refer to as the intensity principle.
Suppose the difference of the principal’s expected payoff under legal regimeK
as compared to regime J is monotonically increasing with precaution. Then
the principal has the incentive for inducing higher precaution under regime
K than under J , that is K provides more intense incentives for precaution
than J . While monotonicity of the difference is a sufficient condition only,
nonetheless, is turns out to allow for ranking the different damages regimes
quite generally. Moreover, the condition is easy to check.
On intuitive grounds, the intensity principle is a straightforward extension
of the externality principle: Suppose the difference between social welfare and
the principal’s payoff is increasing with precaution then precaution imposes
a positive externality and, according to common wisdom, the principal has
insufficient precaution incentives as compared to first best. The intensity
principle rests on the same intuition.
In Schweizer (2009), I have compared different damages regimes for a
setting where the principal takes the precaution decision herself. When-
ever the compensation principle is met in the sense of the victim being fully
compensated for deviations from the due care standard and if this standard
maximizes the social surplus then the injurer has the incentive to meet the
standard. Incentives, however, may be distorted if courts impose inefficient
standards.
Under vicarious liability, there is a second source of distortions as the
principal may have to grant an information rent to induce precaution. From
a social perspective, information rents constitute mere redistribution. The
principal, however, perceives them as costs. This discrepancy between private
and social costs may further distort incentives. In a world of second best,
the damages regime in place affects both the intensity and the efficiency of
incentives.
As it turns out, at common due care standards, the negligence rule and
proportional liability both provide (weakly) more intense precaution incen-
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tives than strict liability. If the information rent is increasing in precaution
then proportional liability provides, compared with first best, insufficient pre-
caution incentives. At fixed standards, comparing the intensity of precaution
incentives under proportional liability and the negligence rule remains am-
biguous. Yet, if courts are aware of the second best problematic involved, by
choosing due care standards suitably, they can implement the widest range
of precaution under the negligence rule and, in this sense, the negligence rule
performs best. Only if the principal does not have to leave information rents
to her agent, the wider range of the negligence rule is of no use for improving
incentives in terms of efficiency.
Moreover, in the presence of information rents, the incentives for the prin-
cipal to form the relationship need not be excessive any more as claimed by
some of the previous literature whereas, in the absence of information rents,
these incentives are excessive though, compared with proportional liability,
less so under the negligence rule.
Not all of the present paper’s results are new as there exists a substantial
literature on the law and economics of vicarious liability to build on. Yet, to
the best of my knowledge, the present paper seems first to provide an analysis
based on a single principle while taking monitoring costs, information rents,
the principal’s wealth constraint and due care standards that need not be
second best into account.
Kornhauser (1982) and Sykes (1984) examine wealth constraints of the
agent as the basic condition favoring vicarious liability. Sykes also discusses
the allocation of risk between the principal and the agent. Information rents
as a source of distortion, however, are not considered.
Kramer and Sykes (1987) discuss the effect of imposing vicarious liabil-
ity on government bodies. According to their findings, a negligence-based
liability rule might be preferred as compared to the strict liability under the
respondeat superior doctrine. While some of my results might be of use for
the analysis of government liability as well, details are not spelled out in the
present paper.
Hansmann and Kraakman (1991) deal with liability imposed on the own-
ers of a firm. The formal setting of the present paper seems general enough
to cover this kind of liability as well.
Polinsky and Shavell (1993) point out that a culpable agent faces, at
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most, the loss of his job and of his limited assets. They propose criminal
liability for employees as their limited assets insulate them from contractual
sanctions. The present paper concentrates on remedies under civil law but
explores the combination of several features as mentioned above.
Shavell (2005), deals with minimum assets requirements as solution to
the judgement-proof problem. The present paper, in contrast, explores the
scope of stirring precaution by agents with a given wealth constraint.
Demougin and Fluet (1999) take information rents into account. Their
analysis, however, is confined to strict liability versus the negligence rule.
Moreover, they consider due care standards that are specified at first best
level only.
Stremitzer and Tabbach (2009), finally, consider the case of a judgement-
proof injurer and establish the superiority of proportional liability among a
whole set of other regimes. While they do not examine vicarious liability,
the finding of the present paper uncovers that it is the missing information
rent that drives their result.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the ac-
cident model and the three damages regimes. Section 3 makes use of the
intensity principle to compare precaution incentives in a setting of moral
hazard where the agent’s actual precaution may remain hidden to the prin-
cipal. Section 4 extends the intensity principle to cases of adverse selection
in order then to compare precaution incentives along similar lines. Section
5 concludes. In the appendix, finally, the required monotonicity of costs as
perceived by the principal will explicitly be derived for a differentiable version
of the moral hazard setting.
2 Damages rules
The general setting is as follows. Let S denote the social surplus that the
principal and her agent can produce by forming a relationship. The agent’s
reservation payoff u ≥ 0 is assumed equal to the social surplus that he would
produce outside the relationship.
The activity of the principal-agent relationship is potentially harmful to
society. The probability of an accident ε(x) is a decreasing function of the
agent’s precaution x ∈ [0,∞). At precaution x, the agent’s effort costs
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amount to c(x) ≥ 0 which are strictly increasing in x. To ensure that the
principal’s and the agent’s maximum problems have solutions, both ε(x) and
c(x) are assumed to be continuous functions of precaution.2
The social loss in case of an accident is of fixed size L. Effort costs and
loss are expressed in monetary equivalences. The above setting is commonly
referred to as the accident model.
The following three damages rules will be compared. First, under strict
liability (in the narrow sense), the injurer owes DS = L to the victim when-
ever an accident has occurred. Second, under the negligence rule with due
care standard xo, the injurer owes
DN(x, xo) =
{
L if x < xo
0 else
to the victim in case of an accident provided that precaution x has been
chosen.
Notice, the negligence rule can also be interpreted as strict liability but
taking causality and the but-for test into account. Under such an interpre-
tation, xo would follow from the preponderance standard.
As a third regime, I consider proportional liability at due care standard
xo. Under this regime, the injurer owes damages
DP (x, xo) =
{
ε(x)−ε(xo)
ε(x)
· L if x < xo
0 else
to the victim.3 For notational convenience, letDS(x, xo) = L denote damages
under strict liability even if strict liability (in the narrow sense) is neither
based on a due care level nor on actual precaution.
For all of the above damages regime J ∈ {S,N, P}, the victim’s expected
payoff under precaution x amounts to −ε(x) · L + ε(x) · DJ(x, xo) and can
never be lower than under due precaution xo. All damages rules that fully
compensate the victim for deviations provide efficient precaution incentives
2As the intensity principle does not make use of differentiability, the case where the set
of feasible precautions is a finite subset of the real numbers could easily be handled along
the same line. To simplify notation, however, the case of discrete precaution choice is not
spelled out explicitly.
3In Schweizer (2009), I have shown that proportional liability may be interpreted as
correct expectation damages on average over the observed event.
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for the injurer under the following two assumptions: (i) the due care level is
fixed at its efficient level and (ii) the injurer is not wealth constrained. In
fact, social surplus is highest under efficient precaution. Moreover, since the
victim’s payoff is never below the one under efficient precaution, the residual
must be highest under efficient precaution as well and, hence, the injurer has
efficient precaution incentives indeed if the two assumptions (i) and (ii) are
met.
If, however, one or both of the two assumptions are violated, precaution
incentives may be distorted. In particular, distortions may arise if courts
specify due care at inefficient levels, if the injurer is wealth constrained or if,
under vicarious liability, the principal must pay information rents to her agent
in order to induce precaution. In such cases, it well matters for efficiency
which damages regime is in place as will be fully explored in the next section.
3 Comparing precaution incentives under dif-
ferent damages regimes
In the present section, it is assumed that the agent’s precaution decision
may remain hidden to the principal. Moreover, the agent’s wealth amounts
to h ≥ 0 which limits his ability to pay.
Suppose the principal wants the agent to choose precaution x but cannot
directly control the agent’s decision. Rather, to detect the agent’s shirking
with probability p, the principal must bear costs amounting to G(p). Yet,
even if shirking is detected, the principal cannot collect more than h from
her agent.
By offering a suitable bonus contract, the principal can generate addi-
tional incentives for her agent. Such a bonus contract offers a non-contingent
payment t to the agent and, on top of it, a bonus b whenever the accident
is avoided. Given the agent’s wealth constraint, such a bonus contract is
feasible if t+ h ≥ 0 and t+ b+ h ≥ 0 both hold.
This bonus contract induces precaution x at rent r if the following three
conditions are met:
t+ b · (1− ε(x))− c(x) = u+ r (1)
7
t+ b · (1− ε(x′))− c(x′) ≤ u+ r (2)
holds for all x′ > x and
−p · h+ (1− p) · [t+ b · (1− ε(x′))]− c(x′) ≤ u+ r (3)
holds for all x′ < x. In fact, by choosing precaution x, the agent obtains the
rent r in excess of his outside option and none of the available deviations
leads to a higher payoff. Under this contract, the agent has the incentive to
choose precaution x indeed.
For a given detection probability p, let R(x, p) denote the minimum rent
r ≥ 0 at which precaution x can be induced by the principal. Under perfect
monitoring (p = 1), the principal can induce any precaution at zero rent. In
fact, she just has to offer the fixed payment t = u+ c(x) at zero bonus to her
agent. If, however, monitoring is less than perfect (p < 1), the minimum rent
may well be positive. If it is the principal will offer a pure bonus contract
which requires the agent, in case of an accident, to hand over his wealth to
the principal (t + h = 0) who, in turn, pays damages to the victim. This
result will formally be established in the appendix.
If monitoring costs are not prohibitive, to induce precaution x at low-
est costs, the principal monitors the agent as to detect his shirking with
probability
π(x) ∈ argmin
p
R(x, p) +G(p).
Her monitoring costs γ(x) = G(π(x)) constitute costs also from the social
perspective. The information rent ρ(x) = R(x, π(x)), however, is mere redis-
tribution. Total costs as perceived by the agent amount to κ(x) = γ(x)+ρ(x)
and are assumed continuous and increasing with precaution. In the appen-
dix, these properties of κ(x) will be formally established. Throughout the
main part of the paper, the following assumption is imposed.
Assumption M: If x < x′ then ε(x) ≥ ε(x′), κ(x) ≤ κ(x′) and 0 ≤ c(x) <
c(x′). Moreover, limx→∞ c(x) =∞.
This assumption ensures that the first best solution as well as the set of
precautions the principal may possibly be willing to induce remain bounded.
The principal may be protected by limited liability or she may be wealth
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constrained herself.4 In any case, an upper bound H(x) ≥ 0 is assumed
to exist which limits damages claims. I have three interpretations in mind.
First, the principal’s wealth constraint never binds in which case H(x) ≡ L.
Second, the principal is protected by limited liability in which case H(x) ≡
HL < L. Third, the principal’s wealth is not sufficient to compensate for
the loss caused by an accident and she is not protected by limited liability.
In this case, the upper limit H(x) ≤ L may interfere with the principal’s
payments to the agent and, hence, may depend on the precaution x that was
actually induced by her. It is assumed, however, that the term
−ε(x) · [L−H(x)] (4)
remains (weakly) monotonically increasing in precaution.5
Wealth is assumed non-divertible. As a consequence, the victim can ac-
tually collect damages amounting to
min
[
DJ(x, xo), H(x)
]
(5)
if regime J is in place.
Under the above assumptions, the principal has the incentive to induce
precaution x from the set
arg max
x∈[0,∞)
φJ(x, xo) = S − u− c(x)− κ(x)− ε(x) ·min
[
DJ(x, xo), H(x)
]
.
In fact, the principal must bear monitoring costs γ(x) and she must compen-
sate her agent for effort costs c(x). Moreover, on top of the agent’s outside
option u, she may have to cover information rent ρ(x) to induce precaution
x. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the victim directly claims
damages (5) from the principal who, in turn, may collect the agent’s contri-
bution through the appropriate bonus contract. Notice, if the costs κ(x) as
perceived by the principal vanish then the above setting is equivalent to the
one where no agent is involved as the principal takes the precaution decision
herself. In this sense, the present setting contains judgement-proof injurers
as a special case.
4The principal’s wealth is assumed sufficient to reimburse the agent as laid down in
their contract.
5Without this assumption, some of the results may be lost for the same reasons as
explained by Beard (1990).
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Due to assumption M, under any regime J from {N,P} truly based on a
due care standard, the principal has no incentive to induce precaution in ex-
cess of the standard. For ease of comparison, precaution choice is artificially
constrained to the range [0, xo] under strict liability S as well.
For later reference, notice that the principal’s payoff under the propor-
tionality regime amounts to
φP (x, xo) = max[ε(xo) · L+ φ∆(x), φS(x, xo)] (6)
as can easily be shown where
σ(x) = S − u− c(x)− γ(x)− ε(x) · L
denotes social surplus in excess of the agent’s outside option u and where
φ∆(x) = σ(x) − ρ(x) denotes the principal’s payoff if her wealth constraint
never binds and if she is not protected by limited liability. Notice, monitoring
costs are included included in the social welfare but not the information rent
because this rent constitutes mere redistribution and, hence, does not affect
welfare.6 Notice further that φN(x, xo) = φS(x, xo) holds in the range x < xo
whereas
φN(xo, xo) = φP (xo, xo) = ε(xo) · L+ σ(xo)− ρ(xo)
if the standard is met.
To compare precaution incentives under different damages regimes, use
of the following intensity principle is made. Damages regime K is said to
generate higher precaution incentives than regime J , for short J(xo) ≤ K(xo)
if, for any xJ that maximizes the principal’s payoff function φJ(x, xo) in the
range [0, xo], there exists xK ≥ xJ that maximizes the principal’s payoff func-
tion φK(x, xo) in the same range. Notice, if the precautions that maximize
the principal’s payoff functions happen to be unique, then the order relation
xK ≥ xJ necessarily must hold whereas if maximizers fail to be unique then,
at least, there exists an order preserving selection from the set of maximizers.
The following proposition establishes that the monotonicity of the difference
of the principal’s payoff function is sufficient for J(xo) ≤ K(xo) to hold.
Proposition 1 (intensity principle) If the difference of the principal’s ex-
pected payoff φK(x, xo)−φJ(x, xo) is increasing in the range 0 ≤ x ≤ xo then
6Notice, from the social perspective, the relationship between the principal and the
agent operating at precaution x would be desirable if σ(x) > 0 holds.
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regime K generates higher precaution incentives at due care standard xo than
regime J in the sense that J(xo) ≤ K(xo) as defined above must hold.
Proof. Suppose precaution xJ maximizes φJ(x, xo) in the range [0, xo]
and take any precaution x < xJ . Then
φK(x, xo) ≤ φK(xJ , xo)−
[
φJ(xJ , xo)− φJ(x, xo)
]
≤ φK(xJ , xo)
as follows from the assumed monotonicity of the difference of the two payoff
functions. It follows that the principal’s payoff at precaution xJ but under
regime K is at least as high as under any lower precaution and, hence, a
(weakly) higher precaution must exist in the range [xJ , xo] at which φK(x, xo)
attains its maximum in the range [0, xo].
The intensity principle is a straightforward extension of the externality
principle. In fact, if the difference σ(x)− φJ(x, xo) is increasing in the range
[0, xo] then precaution generates a positive externality to the rest of the
world and, in accordance with the externality principle, regime J provides
insufficient incentives from the social perspective. The intensity principle is
a straightforward extension of this externality principle.
To make use of the intensity principle, notice that the differences
φN(x, xo)− φS(x, xo) and φP (x, xo)− φS(x, xo)
are both monotonically increasing in the range 0 ≤ x ≤ xo. While the
first claim is obviously true, the second follows from (6) and the assumed
monotonicity of the term (4).
Similarly, due to (4), φ∆(x)− φS(x) and, hence,
φ∆(x)− φP (x, xo) = min
[
−ε(xo) · L, φ∆(x)− φS(x)
]
(7)
are also monotonically increasing in the range [0, xo].
As a consequence, if the information rent is monotonically increasing then,
as follows from (7) and the definition of φ∆(x), precaution under the propor-
tionality rule generates a positive externality and, hence, for any precaution
xP which maximizes the principal’s payoff function φP (x, xo), there exists
xFB ≥ xP which maximizes social surplus in the range [0, xo] or, for short,
P (xo) ≤ FB(xo) where FB refers to first best.
Based on the monotonicity of the above differences, the intensity principle
immediately leads to the following conclusions.
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Proposition 2 At any due care standard xo, the following intensity relations
hold:
(1) S(xo) ≤ N(xo) and S(xo) ≤ P (xo) ≤ ∆(xo)
(2) If, under the negligence rule N , it is not optimal for the principal to
meet the due care level then
S(xo) = N(xo) ≤ P (xo)
(3) If, under the negligence rule N , it is optimal for the principal to meet
the due care level then
argmax
x
φP (x, xo) = argmax
x≤xo
σ(x)− ρ(x)
(4) If the information rent ρ(x) is monotonically increasing then ∆(xo) ≤
FB(xo).
Proof. Claim (1) directly follows from the intensity principle. Since
φN(x, xo) = φS(x) holds for any x < xo, claim (2) must obviously be true.
As for claim (3), since
φN(x, xo) = φS(x, xo) ≤ φN(xo, xo) = ε(xo) · L+ σ(xo)− ρ(xo) = φP (xo, xo)
holds for all x ≤ xo, it follows from (6) that
argmax
x
φP (x, xo) = argmax
x≤xo
ε(xo) · L+ σ(x)− ρ(x) = argmax
x≤xo
σ(x)− ρ(x)
must hold indeed.
Claim (4), finally, directly follows from the monotonicity of
σ(x)− φ∆(x, xo) = ρ(x).
The proposition uncovers new insights but it also generalizes known yet
disparate results under the unifying frame of the intensity principle.
First, if no information rent is needed to induce precaution (that is ρ(x) ≡
0) then either proportional liability performs as well as first best constrained
to the range [0, xo], i.e. P (xo) = FB(xo) or
S(xo) = N(xo) ≤ P (xo) ≤ FB(xo)
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must hold. This result generalizes Kahan’s (1989) findings that proportional
liability outperforms the negligence rule even if courts were known to impose
inefficient standards. In fact, if social surplus σ(x) is a concave function of
precaution (as commonly assumed) and if N(xo) ≤ P (xo) ≤ FB(xo) holds
then proportional liability leads closer to first best than the negligence rule.
Notice, second, Kahan’s analysis did not take wealth constraints into
account. Stremitzer and Tabbach (2009), in contrast, have extended Kahan’s
findings to the case of a single, judgement-proof injurer acting on its own.
The above proposition contains their findings as a special case too.
If, however, the information rent is strictly increasing then the superiority
of proportional liability can no longer be taken for granted. In fact, due
to the increasing rent, proportional liability provides precaution incentives
below the first best level and, for that reason, the more intense precaution
incentives possibly generated by the negligence rule may become socially
desirable. This result generalizes the findings of Demougin and Fluet (1999)
who have shown that, due to the information rent, strict liability leads to
underprovision of care.
The above proposition rests on the corresponding differences of payoff
functions being monotonically increasing in precaution. But some of the
payoff functions can also be ranked in terms of value. In fact, for any pre-
caution x from the range [0, xo] the following order relations are easily seen
to hold:
φN(x, xo) ≥ φS(x, xo) ≥ σ(x)− ρ(x) (8)
and, as follows from (6),
φP (x, xo) ≥ φS(x, xo) and φP (x, xo) ≥ φN(x, xo) (9)
These comparisons allow to rank damages regimes from the principal’s per-
spective.
Proposition 3 At any fixed due care level xo, the principal prefers the neg-
ligence rule over strict liability, the latter constrained to the range [0, xo].
Moreover, she prefers proportional liability over both the negligence rule and
strict liability. Finally, in the absence of information rents, all four damages
rules generate excessive incentives to form the relationship.
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Proof. Suppose precaution xj maximizes the principal’s payoff function
in the range [0, xo] for j ∈ {J,K} and φK(x, xo) ≥ φJ(x, xo) holds for all
precautions from the same range then, of course,
φK(xK , xo) ≥ φK(xJ , xo) ≥ φJ(xJ , xo)
must also hold and the principal prefers damages regime K over regime J
indeed.
Similarly, in the absence of information rents, φS(x, xo) ≥ σ(x) holds in
the range [0, xo]. Therefore, under strict liability constrained to this range,
the principal’s maximum payoff (weakly) exceeds the social surplus from
running the activity even at the first best precaution from that range. As
a consequence, parameter configurations exist where the principal’s payoff is
positive whereas the social surplus is negative. As the principal’s payoff under
the other damages regimes exceeds those under strict liability (constrained
to the range [0, xo]), the principal’s incentives to form the relationship is even
higher. This establishes the final claim of the proposition.
Notice, since the principal prefers proportional liability P as compared
with negligence rule N , she has higher incentives to form the relationship
under P than under N . These incentives may be excessive under both rules
but, as a consequence of this result, less so under N .
So far, the intensity of precaution incentives has been compared for a
given due care standard. Yet, if courts take the second best nature of vicari-
ous liability into account, they may adapt the due care level to the damages
regime in place. The remaining part of the present section is devoted to
examining the ranges of precautions that can be implemented under various
damages regimes if courts define the due care standard suitably.
Recall, for liability rules N and P that are truly based on a due care level,
the principal will never induce precaution in excess of that level. Moreover,
due to assumption M, there exists a finite upper bound xM for all precautions
that qualify for first best or would be induced under strict liability S (in the
narrow sense). The following proposition establishes that the negligence rule
allows implementing the widest range of precaution levels among all of the
above damages regimes.
Proposition 4 (1) If xS maximizes the principal’s payoff under strict li-
ability S then xS also maximizes the principal’s payoff under proportional
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liability at due care standard xo = xS
(2) If xo maximizes the principal’s payoff under proportional liability P
at due care standard xo then xo also maximizes the principal’s payoff under
the negligence rule N at due care standard xo
(3) If xP < xo maximizes the principal’s payoff under proportional liability
P at due care standard xo then xP maximizes the principal’s payoff under the
negligence rule N either at due care standard xP or at due care standard xo.
Proof. To simplify notation, let
XJ(xo) = argmax
x≤xo
φJ(x, xo)
denote the set of precautions that maximize the principal’s payoff in the
range [0, xo] if damages regime J is in place.
As for the first claim, take any xS ∈ XS(∞) = XS(xM). Since x
S ∈
XS(xS) must also hold and since φP (x, xS) − φS(x, xS) is monotonically in-
creasing in the range [0, xS] it follows that S(xS) ≤ P (xS) and, hence, that
xS ∈ XP (xS) must hold indeed. The first claim is established.
As for the second claim, suppose xo /∈ XN(xo). Then there exists xN < xo
such that
φP (xN , xo) ≥ φN(xN , xo) > φN(xo, xo) = φP (xo, xo)
and, hence, xo /∈ XP (xo). This establishes the second claim.
To establish the third claim, two subcases are distinguished. Recall (6)
and suppose, first, that
φP (xP , xo) = ε(xo) · L+ σ(xP )− ρ(xP )
is valid. It follows that
ε(xo) · L+ σ(xP )− ρ(xP ) ≥ ε(xo) · L+ σ(x)− ρ(x)
and, hence,
ε(xP ) · L+ σ(xP )− ρ(xP ) ≥ ε(xP ) · L+ σ(x)− ρ(x)
holds for all x ≤ xo. Moreover,
ε(xP ) · L+ σ(xP )− ρ(xP ) ≥ ε(xo) · L+ σ(xP )− ρ(xP ) ≥ φS(x)
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also holds for all x ≤ xo from which it follows that xP ∈ XP (xP ) and, hence,
from claim 2 that xP ∈ XN(xP ). This establishes claim 3 under the first
constellation.
Suppose, second, that
φP (xP , xo) = φS(xP )
is valid. It then follows that
φP (xP , xo) = φS(xP ) ≥ φS(x)
and
φP (xP , xo) = φS(xP ) ≥ ΦP (xo, xo) = φN(xo, xo)
and, hence, that
φN(xP , xo) = φS(xP ) ≥ φN(x, xo)
holds for all x ≤ xo. Therefore, xP ∈ XN(xo) and claim 3 is fully established.
Let x∆ be the (largest) precaution that maximizes payoff function φ∆(x).
No precaution in excess of x∆ can be implemented under proportional lia-
bility. Yet, by raising the due care standard xo slightly above x∆, due to
the discontinuity of the principal’s payoff function, this standard would still
be kept under the negligence rule. Moreover, if the information rent is an
increasing function of precaution, it would be socially desirable to raise the
induced precaution beyond x∆. This finding provides yet another justifica-
tion of the negligence rule based on efficiency considerations.
4 Adverse selection and the intensity princi-
ple
In the present section, the intensity principle is extended to the following
setting of adverse selection. The principal expects the agent she faces to be
of type i = 1, ..., n with probability fi where f1 + ... + fn = 1. The agent
knows his type. All types choose precaution from the non-negative real line.
At precaution xi, the accident involving a social loss L of fixed size occurs
with probability ε(xi). While an agent’s type is his private information,
precaution is assumed observable if adverse selection is involved.
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The social surplus S that is generated by the relationship between the
principal and her agent as well as the reservation payoff u do not depend
on the agent’s type. The effort costs ci(xi), however, are type-contingent.
Monotonicity assumptions are imposed as before. Moreover, a single-crossing
property is also assumed to hold. Type-contingent precaution profiles are
denoted by x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ X = [0,∞)
n whereas one-dimensional real
variables are denoted by xi and, where appropriate, by y ∈ [0,∞). The
assumptions of the present section can then be summarized as follows.
Assumptions: Suppose y < y′ then
(M): ε(y) ≥ ε(y′) and ci(y) < ci(y
′). Moreover, limy→∞ ci(y) = ∞ holds
for each type.
(SCP): 0 ≤ ci(y)− ci+1(y) < ci(y
′)− ci+1(y
′) holds for i = 1, ..., n− 1.
Suppose the principal wants to induce type-contingent precaution x ∈ X.
Without loss of generality (revelation principle), she may do so by offering
an incentive compatible contract
[(x1, t1), ..., ((xn, tn)]
which directly asks the agent for his type. To ensure truthful revelation,
incentive compatibility constraints must be met. Due to assumption (SCP)
it is enough to check for the local constraints:
Ri = ti − ci(xi) ≥ ti+1 − ci(xi+1)
and
Ri+1 = ti+1 − ci+1(xi+1) ≥ ti − ci+1(xi)
The first constraint (upwards) requires that an agent of type i cannot gain
from pretending to be of type i + 1 whereas the second constraint (down-
wards) requires that an agent of type i+1 cannot gain from reporting type i.
Given such an incentive compatible contract, the principal pays an expected
information rent r = f1 · (R1 − u) + ...+ fn · (Rn − u) to the agent. Let ρ(x)
denote the minimum expected information rent at which the principal can
induce type-contingent precaution x ∈ X. The following proposition rests
on the single-crossing property and is well-known from the literature.
Proposition 5 (1) If the contract [(x1, t1), ..., ((xn, tn)] is incentive compat-
ible, then xi ≤ xi+1, Ri ≤ Ri+1 and ti ≤ ti+1 hold for i = 1, ..., n− 1
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(2) If xi ≤ xi+1 holds for i = 1, ..., n−1 then there exist payments t1, ..., tn
such that the contract [(x1, t1), ..., ((xn, tn)] is incentive compatible
(3) The expected information rent is additively separable, that is ρ(x) =∑n
i=1 fi · ρi(xi) where ρn(xn) = 0 and ρi(xi) strictly increasing in xi for
i = 1, ..., n− 1.
Proof. For convenience, let me briefly recall the main steps of the argu-
ment. It follows from the local incentive compatibility constraints that
0 ≤ ci(xi)− ci+1(xi) ≤ Ri+1 −Ri ≤ ci(xi+1)− ci+1(xi+1)
holds for i = 1, ..., n− 1 and, by the single-crossing property, that the type-
contingent precaution must be monotonically increasing with the type.
To minimize the expected information rent, the principal chooses an in-
centive compatible contract such that the downwards constraints are binding,
that is R1 = u and ci(xi)− ci+1(xi) = Ri+1−Ri holds for i = 1, ..., n− 1. By
solving recursively and by rearranging terms, it follows that
fi · ρi(xi) =
[
n−1∑
k=i
fk+1
]
· [ci(xi)− ci+1(xi)]
and, by making use of the single-crossing property, that ρi(xi) must be in-
creasing indeed.
Notice, the minimum rent Ri as constructed in the above proof depends
on all precaution levels of lower types, i.e. Ri = Ri(x1, ..., xi−1). Therefore, if
the principal were wealth constrained her ability to cover damages may also
depend on all these precaution levels. Yet, to avoid difficulties that would
arise from such dependence, let me assume that the principal’s wealth con-
straint is never binding. She may, however, by protected by limited liability.
The upper bound Hi(xi) ≤ L may actually depend on the agent’s type and
the precaution chosen by that type but not on the precaution potentially
chosen by other types.
It follows from the above proposition that type-contingent precautions
x ∈ X can be induced if and only if they are increasing in type. Let Xm =
{x ∈ X : xi ≤ xi+1 for i = 1, ..., n − 1} denote the set of such monotonic
type-contingent precautions.
The same damages regimes are considered as in section 3 but the due care
levels xo = (xo1, ..., x
o
n) ∈ X may now also be type-contingent. Let me assume,
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however, that xo is monotonic because, otherwise it would be impossible for
the principal to meet the due care standards, irrespective of which type her
agent happens to be.
The expected social surplus σ(x) in excess of u amounts to
σ(x) =
n∑
i=1
fi · σi(xi) =
n∑
i=1
fi · [S − u− ci(xi)− ε(xi) · L]
and, hence, is additively separable. Due to assumption (SCP), the difference
σi+1(y)− σi(y) = ci(y)− ci+1(y) is strictly monotonically increasing. There-
fore, the first best precaution from the range x ≤ xo has to be monotonic as
the following lemma establishes.7
Lemma 1 If xFB ∈ argmaxx≤xo σ(x) then x
FB ∈ Xm.
Proof. Assume the contrary such that there exists a type i for which
xFBi+1 < x
FB
i ≤ x
o
i ≤ x
o
i+1 holds. It then follows from the single crossing
property that σi+1(x
FB
i+1)− σi(x
FB
i+1) < σi+1(x
FB
i )− σi(x
FB
i ) and, hence, that
σi+1(x
FB
i+1) < σi+1(x
FB
i )−
[
σi(x
FB
i )− σi(x
FB
i+1)
]
≤ σi+1(x
FB
i ), a contradiction
to the optimality of xFBi+1 for type i+ 1.
Under damages regime J ∈ {S,N, P}, the injurer owes damagesDJ(xi, x
o
i )
to the victim. Due to the possibly limited liability of the principal, the vic-
tim actually recovers min[DJ(xi, x
o
i ), Hi(xi)] only if the agent happens to
be of type i and an accident has occurred. As in the previous section, the
terms −ε(xi) · [L−Hi(xi] are assumed (weakly) monotonically increasing in
precaution. The principal’s expected payoff amounts to
φJ(x, xo) =
n∑
i=1
fi · φ
J
i (xi, x
o
i )
where
φJi (xi, x
o
i ) = S − u− ci(xi)− ρi(xi)− ε(xi) ·min[D
J(xi, x
o
i ), Hi(xi)]
if damages regime J is in place and type-contingent precautions x ∈ Xm
have been induced. Notice, this payoff is additively separable as well. Under
proportional liability,
φPi (xi, x
o
i ) = max
[
ε(xoi ) · L+ σi(xi)− ρi(xi), φ
S(xi, x
o
i )
]
(10)
7For x, x′ ∈ X = [0,∞)n, x ≤ x′ is defined to hold if it holds type by type, that is if
xi ≤ x
′
i
holds for i = 1, ..., n.
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holds for the same reason as in the previous section (see (6)).
Under damages regimes J ∈ {N,P} truly based on a due care standard,
the principal has no incentives to induce precaution in excess of the due care
standard as the following lemma establishes.
Lemma 2 For damages regimes J truly based on a due care standard, if
xJ ∈ argmaxx∈Xm φ
J(x, xo) then xJ ≤ xo holds type by type.
Proof. If xJ ≤ xo then we are done. Otherwise, let g denote the lowest
type, for which xoi < x
J
i holds. By lowering x
J
i to x
o
i , the principal’s payoff
would strictly increase, a contradiction to the assumed optimality of xJ .
Again for ease of comparison, precaution choice is artificially constrained
to the range x ≤ xo (type by type) under strict liability J = S and if first
best is at stake.
Comparing the intensity of precautions under the three damages regimes
proceeds now along similar lines as in the previous section. At due care
levels xo ∈ Xm, damages regime K is said to generate higher precaution
incentives than regime J or, for short, J(xo) ≤ K(xo) if, for any xJ ∈ Xm
that maximizes the principal’s payoff under damages regime J in the range
x ≤ xo, there exists xK ∈ Xm that maximizes the principal’s payoff under
regime K in the same range and such that xJ ≤ xK holds type by type. The
following proposition extends the intensity principle to the setting of adverse
selection.
Proposition 6 (intensity principle under adverse selection) If the difference
of the principal’s expected payoff φKi (xi, x
o
i ) − φ
J
i (xi, x
o
i ) is increasing in the
range 0 ≤ xi ≤ x
o
i then regime K generates higher precaution incentives at
due care standard xo than regime J , that is J(xo) ≤ K(xo) must hold.
Proof. Suppose xJ ∈ Xm maximizes the principal’s payoff under dam-
ages regime J whereas xK ∈ Xm maximizes the principal’s payoff under
regime K in the range x ≤ xo. If xJ ≤ xK holds type by type then we are
done.
Otherwise, let g be the highest index for which xKg < x
J
g . By increasing
xKg to x
J
g , due to the monotonicity of the difference, the principal’s payoff
under rule K cannot decrease. To fully establish the proposition, the above
procedure must possibly be repeated but, after finitely many repetitions, an
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optimizer under rule K is found in the range between xJ and xo, type by
type.
By making use of the above version of the intensity principle, Proposition
2 can now easily be extended to cover the case of adverse selection. In
particular, since the expected information rent in the present section has
been shown to be increasing the following version of the proposition holds.
Proposition 7 For any possibly type-contingent due care standards xo ∈
Xm, the following intensity relations hold:
S(xo) ≤ N(xo) and S(xo) ≤ P (xo) ≤ FB(xo)
Demougin and Fluet (1999) have shown that, in the presence of informa-
tion rents, strict liability leads to underprovision of care and the negligence
rule dominates strict liability if the due care level is defined at its first best
level. The above proposition extends their findings by taking further damages
regimes into account and by allowing for type-contingent due care standards
other than first best. In fact, due to the second best problem involved, in-
centives at lower standards may lead closer to efficient precaution.
The order relations (8) and (9) and, hence, Proposition 3 based on them
also remain valid in the present setting of adverse selection. Proposition 4 (1)
continues to hold as well. The remaining claims of Proposition 4, however,
do not generalize easily if the principal is bindingly protected by limited
liability. Yet, if she is not, the negligence rule can still be shown to allow for
the widest range of precautions that can be implemented by courts.
In fact, if the principal’s wealth constraint never binds then her payoff
under proportional liability simplifies to
φP (x, xo) =
[
n∑
i=1
fi · ε(x
o
i )
]
· L+ φS(x)
as follows from (10). Suppose now that precaution xP ∈ X maximizes the
principal’s expected payoff under proportional liability with possibly type-
contingent due care levels xo ∈ X. It then follows from lemma 2 above that
xP ≤ xo holds type by type and, hence, xP must maximize the principal’s
expected payoff also under strict liability artificially constrained by xo and, a
fortiori, by xP . As the negligence rule provides (weakly) stronger precaution
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incentives than strict liability (see Proposition 7 above), it follows that xP
has to maximize the principal’s expected payoff under the negligence rule
as well provided that type-contingent precaution standards xP are imposed
by courts. In this sense, the negligence rule still offers the widest range of
implementable precautions, even if adverse selection is involved.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper examines vicarious liability in a setting that takes monitoring
costs, information rents and wealth constraints of the agent but also of his
principal into account. Given the second best problematic involved, the exact
specification of damages matters. While the negligence rule allows for the
widest range of implementable precaution levels, it may no longer be optimal
for courts to impose precaution standards at their efficient (first best) level.
All findings of the present paper directly follow from the intensity prin-
ciple. To be sure, a damages regime may possibly provide more intense
precaution incentives than another one even if the difference in the prin-
cipal’s payoff functions is not monotonically increasing in the whole range
of definition. But in the setting of the present paper, monotonicity of the
difference follows from the monotonicity of the probability of an accident
and the costs as perceived by the principal as a function of precaution quite
generally. Neither differentiability nor concavity as imposed by most of the
related literature is needed here.
I have checked many other results from the economic analysis of tort and
contract law to find out that, whenever comparing incentives under different
regimes is at stake, the monotonicity of the difference happens to hold such
that these other findings could also be traced back to the intensity principle.
In Schweizer (2010), I have examined the effects of breach remedies and
performance excuses on investment decisions. These findings were based on
the externality principle of which the intensity principle is a straightforward
extension. As monotonicity is maintained under the expectation operator,
integration by parts can be dispensed with which simplifies the analysis sub-
stantially and supports the intuition behind the results. The present paper
adds further evidence to the claim that examining the difference of payoff
functions might be the most convenient approach if the intensity of incen-
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tives under different institutional arrangements is at stake.
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7 Appendix
In section 3, it has been claimed that, under less than perfect monitoring
(p < 1), the costs κ(x) as perceived by the principal are monotonically in-
creasing in precaution. In this appendix, such monotonicity is shown to hold
in the following differentiable setting indeed. By assumption, the probability
of an accident is a differentiable, decreasing and convex function of precau-
tion. Moreover, the cost c(x) ≥ 0 of precaution is an increasing and convex
function. More precisely, the following assumption is made throughout the
appendix.
Assumption:
1. For all x ∈ X, it holds that ε′(x) < 0 and ε′′(x) > 0
2. For all x ∈ X, it holds that c′(x) > 0 and c′′(x) ≥ 0
At costs G(p), the principal is able to detect the agent’s shirking with
probability p. This cost function is assumed differentiable and increasing
with p. Suppose the feasible bonus contract with fixed payment t and bonus
b induces precaution x at rent r ≥ 0, that is (1) — (3) are assumed to hold and
let R(x, p) denotes the minimum rent r ≥ 0 required to induce precaution x
if shirking is detected with probability p.
Under less than perfect monitoring (p < 1), the following lemma holds.
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Lemma 3 (1) Suppose the bonus contract [t, b ≤ 0] induces precaution x at
rent r ≥ 0. Then
c(x) ≤
p
1− p
· (u+ h+ r) +
c(0)
1− p
(11)
must hold.
(2) Conversely, if (11) holds then the feasible bonus contract t = u+ r +
c(x) with zero bonus b = 0 induces precaution x at rent r.
Proof. (1) Suppose [t, b] induces x at rent r where b ≤ 0. If x = 0 then
claim (11) obviously is met. Therefore, suppose x > 0 and consider shirking
x′ = 0 at its extreme. By combining constraints (1) and (3), it follows that
(1− p) · c(x) + (1− p) · b · (ε(x)− ε(0)) ≤ p · (u+ h+ r) + c(0)
from which claim (11) follows immediately.
(2) Suppose (11) is met. Then the feasible contract t = u + r + x and
b = 0 is easily seen to induce precaution x at rent r.
Monitoring is still assumed to be less than perfect but precaution x vio-
lates (11), i.e.
c(x) >
p
1− p
· (u+ h+ r) +
c(0)
1− p
(12)
and the feasible contract [t, b] induces x at rent r ≥ 0. In this case, the
following lemma holds.
Lemma 4 The bonus must be positive, i.e. b > 0, the derivative of the payoff
function must be non-positive at x, i.e. −b ·ε′(x)−c′(x) ≤ 0 and y < x where
y = argmax
x′
−p · h+ (1− p) · [t+ b · (1− ε(y))]− c(y). (13)
Moreover,
−p · h+ (1− p) · [t+ b · (1− ε(y))]− c(y) ≤ u+ r (14)
must also hold.
Proof. Since (12) is assumed to hold, it follows from the previous lemma
that both the bonus and precaution must be strictly positive, i.e. b > 0 and
x > 0. It then follows from (2) that −b · ε′(x)− c′(x) ≤ 0 must hold indeed.
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Consider y as in (13). If y = 0 then y < x clearly holds. If, however,
y > 0, it follows from the corresponding first order condition that
−(1− p) · b · ε′(y)− c′(y) = 0
and, hence, that
−b · ε′(x)− c′(x) ≤ 0 = −(1− p) · b · ε′(y)− c′(y) < −b · ε′(y)− c′(y)
such that y < x follows from the assumed concavity of the function −b ·ε(·)−
c(·). Since y < x it follows from (3) that (14) must hold indeed. The lemma
is fully established.
Monitoring is still assumed to be less than perfect and precaution x still
violates (11) and the feasible contract [t, b] induces x at rent r ≥ 0. In this
case, the following lemma also holds.
Lemma 5 Suppose r > 0. If (14) is not binding or if (14) is binding but
t+ h > 0 then R(x, p) < r.
Proof. Suppose, first, that (14) is not binding and consider a marginal
variation of the contract such that (1− ε(x)) · db = dr whereas dt = dx = 0.
Since d [−b · ε′(x)− c′(x)] = −ε′(x) · db, it follows that the new contract still
induces precaution x but at lower rent, provided that b is modified in the
direction db < 0. Therefore, x can be induced at a lower rent indeed if (14)
is not binding.
Suppose, second, that (14) is binding but t+ h > 0. Since
−(1− p) · b · ε′(y)− 1 = 0 < −b · ε′(y)− 1
and since
b · (1− ε(x))− c(x) ≤ b · (1− ε(y))− c(y)
it follows from the concavity of of −b · ε(·) − c(·) that the derivative of the
principal’s payoff function at x must even be strictly negative, i.e. −b·ε′(x)−
c′(x) < 0.
Taking this into account consider a marginal variation of the contract
such that
dt+ (1− ε(x)) · db = dr
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and
(1− p) · dt+ (1− p) · (1− ε(y)) · db = dr
both hold whereas dx = 0. By eliminating dt from the above two equations,
it follows that
(1− p) · (ε(x)− ε(y)) · db = p · dr
must hold. The new contract induces the same precaution but at a lower
rent provided that b is modified in the direction db > 0. The lemma is fully
established.
As a corollary, it follows immediately from the above lemma that the
bonus contract inducing precaution at minimum rent R(x, p) > 0 requires the
agent to transfer his wealth to the agent whenever an accident has occurred,
i.e. t+ h = 0. These findings allow to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Suppose monitoring is less than perfect and R(x, p) > 0.
Then the partial derivative with respect to precaution must be positive, i.e.
Rx(x, p) > 0.
Proof. It follows from the last lemma that a bonus b must exist such
that the rent r = R(x, p) is uniquely determined by the two equations
b · (1− ε(x))− c(x) = u+ h+ r
and
(1− p) · b · (1− ε(y))− c(y) = u+ h+ r
where −(1− p) · b · ε′(y)− 1 = 0. It then follows from the implicit function
theorem that
Rx(x, p) =
(1− p) · (1− ε(y)) · [b · ε′(x) + c′(x)]
p · (1− ε(y)) + [ε(y)− ε(x)]
> 0
holds indeed.
With the above proposition at hand, it can now be shown that the costs
κ(x) of inducing precaution x must be monotonically increasing. In fact, the
principal has the incentive to detect shirking with probability
π(x) = argmax
p
R(x, p) +G(p)
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to be characterized by first order condition Rp(x, π) +Gp(π) ≤ 0, and = 0 if
p > 0. Since total costs as perceived by the principal amount to
κ(x) = R(x, π(x)) +G(π(x))
it follows from the envelope theorem that κx(x) = Rx(x, π(x)) ≥ 0 holds as
was to be shown.
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